The obvious thought of whether we are doing enough in humanitarian assistance can be easily asked. But the real answer involves more nuance. “Of course we could do more, ” says Keys. “It’s not a question of money. What happens when you cannot reach the refugees or the internally displaced persons? We received a grant to help in Syria but we lack the access.” Keys attributes some of this challenge to the American mentality of identifying a problem and resolving to fixing it in a certain amount of time. “We do a lot of good and make breakthroughs, but when this type of formula is applied indiscriminately everywhere, then we have problems. American policymakers and others could benefit from being more realistic about our role and what missions we can accomplish. We need to find a balance, considering possibly longer term, more sustained engagement over an ‘all-or-nothing’ or time-bounded approach.”

The challenge of dealing with refugee crises and humanitarian assistance stems from deeper issues within a country.  Keys reflects, “When a humanitarian crisis arises in a country that is politically stable, like the U.S and the Katrina crisis or Japan and its tsunami, there is a reasonable expectation that the overall system of governance will return stability once the shorter term crisis is resolved. Katrina is a better situation to have survived than the situation in Port au Prince, Haiti. If you have a functioning society, it increases your chance of dealing with the short-term needs with a return to normalcy.” When natural disaster, governance troubles, and political conflict are in the mix, this work gets really hard. “Don’t just be interested in humanitarian issues because of refugees or the like,” suggests Keys. “Realize there is something about that society that needs addressing of a political nature or societal friction. Why are the refugees there in the first place? You cannot sort out the refugee situation without sorting out other issues over the long term.” Most refugees simply want to go home, Keys emphatically expressed. Roughly 5% of the Iraqi population, or 1.5 million people, are still displaced. The U.S. has resettled about 60,000 Iraqis since 2003.

An increase of natural disasters—drought in Africa and tsunamis in Indonesia, India, and Japan—coupled with areas of political conflict, require the skill sets of organizations such as the IRC. Drought in East Africa proves challenging, with 13 million people’s lives placed in hardship. In Mali, 20% of the population is affected by drought and political conflict, with severe food and water supply shortages. Population growth and urbanization trends also amplify the toll of crisis, says Keys.

Demographic trends in a refugee context highlight the disproportionate share of hardship directed toward women and children. In addition to addressing physical violence directed at women in crisis areas and conflict zones, the IRC has added to their mandate, now including broader women’s empowerment issues. Next week they will launch a special report about domestic violence produced from field work in West Africa at Council on Foreign Relations.

Silence is Not Peace

Why is it we want so much to have peace that we are sometimes willing to accept silence as a substitute? Even though we know that underneath the silence is trouble, trouble we’d rather not talk about.

You know what I mean here. At one level, you have seen it in every conceivable situation in your life. The elevated noise of anger and frustration — at work, at home, in relationships, in child rearing, even in community work. There are always occasions where disagreement causes raised voices and then, often unexpectedly, a sudden silence.

What defines us is whether we are willing to work for true peace or are willing to accept silence instead. That decision defines our character. If we are in a position of leadership, it defines our style as well — one of silence through intimidation or of peace through collaboration and process.

Peace does not mean universal agreement. Peace means mutual respect, and it is the pinnacle of a four-stage process.

Peace begins with liberty — the escape from tyranny. It moves to justice, which begins with revenge but matures into fairness. The process then transitions to freedom — the practice of living a just life. And only then can true peace be realized.

Peace is the byproduct of honing our decisions through the friction of deciding what is just and the healthy tension of protecting the freedoms of opposing thinkers.

People often think Africa, a continent known for so much sorrow through poverty, disease, war, and oppression, does not know peace, that it has settled for silence as a poor substitute. It’s no question that people in opposition of power are silenced in many African countries. But Empower African Children exists to lift up a new generation of young people who learn the value of mutual respect to achieve true peace. We also exist to raise awareness in the United States about the pockets of true peace in Africa. We do this, in addition to our core work in Uganda, because we know that every pocket is proof we can have it in our own lives here. That is important because true peace does not come after everyone’s desires are met, but in spite of the fact that they are not. And in this way, we are all learning from our African students.

In two weeks, I will be traveling back to Uganda with Empower’s first university level study abroad program. With a group of students from SMU’s Embrey Human Rights Program, we will examine how education, technology, health, enterprise, and the arts are being used to restore human rights. Our visiting students will work side by side with our Ugandan university students, as well as meeting the country’s leaders — people who know the difference between peace and silence because they live it.

You will love the stories we bring back from this exchange. Until then, look for signs of the difference between peace and silence in those you come across. And care for those whose voices are not heard — for underneath that silence is the hope of peace.

Parker says that the biggest mistake by the U.S. government was in the summer of 2010, when the U.S. dropped the pretense of neutrality and backed the devout Shiite Maliki for prime minister over Allawi, a secular Shiite supported by the country’s Sunnis.

“This was problematic because the U.S. was picking winners of an election in another country, which is a huge mistake. They should have supported the process of democracy and not backed a specific candidate. Fairness and power-sharing should have been the objective,” Parker says.

When the new Iraqi government was seated in December 2010 under a US-backed power-sharing deal, the White House was disengaging.   Within months, Maliki was crackdowning on Iraqis and their nascent democracy with measures that ensured sectarianism and encouraged his security apparatus to suppress civil liberties and basic freedoms.

According to Parker’s article, Maliki has resorted to demogoguery, fanning Shiite fears of the Sunni minority to sway Shiites his way. Parker suggests that the U.S. and the international community needs to push harder for power-sharing agreements and democracy, drawing “redlines” against the known violence and rights abuses of Maliki’s security apparatus. In turn, the Americans need to push the prime minister’s opponents to work with him and not plot against him. All sides need to overcome their zero-sum game approach to politics.

What can the U.S. do? Parker suggests the U.S. needs to engage Iraq with soft power. “Iraqis want a normal state— to be part of the world, travelling and interacting with foreigners,” says Parker. “There is a hunger for freedom after so much suffering, on both sides. Only Iraqis can fix Iraq and re-direct their democracy toward a path of less politicized institutions. After 2003, they were not left with a stable and safe house. However, by using soft power to be an honest broker to help them move forward, the U.S. can be a bridge toward that future. The U.S. must be clear in supporting Iraq’s process toward democracy, rather than our own domestic political cycles, where Iraq’s path and our support is sacrificed for our own short-term interests.”

(The information in this post is derived largely from Ned Parker’s “The Iraq We Left Behind” in the March/April 2012 Foreign Affairs journal. Follow up questions were developed after his visit to Dallas. The full article includes considerable detail about the politics, security and state of Iraq after 2003.)

Please see a clip about her thoughts, from the Freedom Collection at the George W. Bush Presidential Center.

The scale and scope of this operation is impressive. Though the Navy SEALs are deservedly in the news, there are so many layers to the Navy. And their role keeps growing with new foreign policy twists in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions. Their presence in the Middle East is ‘robust.’ But as ice continues to melt in the Arctic and sealanes open to previously unavailable resources, their role may expand once again.

The relationship between the U.S. Navy and other countries navy’s or similar government arms is key. As with any business—relationships matter—and it is also true with the U.S. Navy, says Sadler. There are “theaters of security cooperation” and new “Rim of the Pacific” exercises between navies of other countries with the U.S.

Interestingly, the Navy has a rich history dating back to the 1812 war with Britain. The important role of the Navy 200 years ago has been maintained, and even expanded as the world has become increasingly interconnected, complex and at times, volatile. The Navy has also kept pace with the times, even being a progressive innovator. Since fuel costs weigh heavily on their budget, as we all feel, they are increasingly becoming green. They intend to be a leader in alternative energy, and meet the Secretary of the Navy’s goal of producing at least 50% of shore-based energy requirements from alternative sources by 2020.

The need to cut the U.S. federal budget, and where to cut, was given new meaning when faced with the reality of how reductions would impact the U.S. military. Seems a scalpel is needed for the real priorities. The work of the Navy underpins a complex system of global interdependencies between nations. And when they are needed, you want those called upon to take on tough challenges to be optimally supplied, trained and have the capabilities to deliver.

Jennifer Warren: What group in the U.S. government do you think has had to change the most to adapt to the threats of terrorism we now face in the world?

Eric Schmitt: In the campaign against terrorism, all U.S. government agencies have had to change since 9/11 to adapt to the threat to humanity. Perhaps the agency that had to change the most is the FBI. It’s gone from being largely focused on traditional crime, white collar crime, and other types of crime to being designated as the chief domestic counterterrorism agency for the U.S. government; that has meant a whole shift in resources, and change in the approach to how they combat problems. Since the beginning, the FBI has been focused on what they consider “the case” and how you build evidence for a case in a court of law, whether criminal or civil.

These efforts are quite different. They are chasing terrorists, and acting more like an intelligence agency, collecting information and analyzing it without necessarily acting on it right away. The mindset of the FBI has had to change and its use of resources. Many more intelligence analysts have been added to work alongside agents in the field for the right combinations.

JW: Would this be considered a change in culture?

ES: Absolutely. There is a shift from being a very prominent and pre-eminent law enforcement agency (which of course it still is) to also being a domestic intelligence agency, working closely with other partners in government and overseas partners. The FBI now sends scores of agents overseas and has offices overseas to work with the law enforcement agencies of other countries, tracking down leads that could eventually link to possible terrorist-type operations in the US.

JW: Do you think the U.S. government has cracked the DNA of terrorist organizations? Or is this a fast-mutating organism that replicates and adapts?

ES: I think the U.S. deals with terrorism much better than it did around 9/11, while still having a long way to go. In our book, we describe this as a new kind of Darwinism where the U.S. government has developed an approach, a counterapproach to combat terrorists. But the terrorists are an agile, adaptive enemy, particularly Al Qaeda. You see the terrorists trying to evade the technical surveillance advantages the US has and our counterterrorism approaches. The U.S. understands more what Al Qaeda is. It’s a networked organization made up of various components. You can attack individual components. You can degrade the overall effectiveness of the organization without having to tackle it all at once. But, you’re dealing with a very nimble enemy. Certainly the Al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan has been hurt. However this fight will go on for many years.

JW: Over the last couple of years, how would you characterize the war on terror related to Pakistan with its role as a supplier of terrorists and a friend the U.S.?

ES: Pakistan poses probably one of the toughest foreign policy challenges for the US government today. It has been a partner with the U.S. since 9/11 in tracking down various Al Qaeda elements that are inside Pakistan. Some of the top leaders of Al Qaeda have been found there obviously, including Osama bin Laden this last May. But as you said, Pakistan, particularly its spy service the ISI, has also been one of the main sponsors of organizations that are fighting Americans in Afghanistan, such as the Taliban, amongst others.

The long-term interests and strategic interests of Pakistan and the US are not completely aligned. The U.S. obviously has more short-term interests. President Obama has already announced that the bulk of U.S. troops will withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. Pakistan looks at this in a much longer time frame. They worry about their arch-enemy India having more influence in Afghanistan after the U.S. leaves; so they are willing to support some of these militant groups, who are acting as their proxies against India and its growing interest in Afghanistan. It creates a great deal of tension in this relationship. It’s not a relationship however that the U.S. can afford to walk away from because of the nature of Pakistan and the number of militant groups that are operating there, and oftentimes working for a common cause on certain operations. Perhaps most worrisome, Pakistan has over a hundred nuclear weapons and it’s facing off against its rival India, which is also a nuclear arms state. This is one of the main reasons why the US has to remain engaged with Pakistan, even as it draws down its forces in neighboring Afghanistan.

JW: What do you think about the idea of exposing too much about intelligence in the public domain?

ES: Anytime we come across classified information, as we do at the NY Times and in this book, we always contact the government agency responsible for the information—be it the CIA, the defense department, or other agencies. We communicate our plans in using the information in the story. If they have reason to believe this information and its publication could jeopardize national security, American lives on the ground, servicemen, or jeopardize tactics, techniques, or procedures that the government may want to use again, let us know. That’s not to say the government has the right of censorship over this, because in many cases the terrorists already know of the techniques being used against them. In fact, the U.S. government sometimes may want these techniques to be known because it could have a deterrent effect.

In our book, we were very careful, as we are everyday, in dealing with classified information. If there is some objection, the government can make a legitimate case as to why that information shouldn’t be included. With the cutting edge topic of cyber terrorism, there were some details that we excluded from the book at the request of the government. We don’t feel the reader is any less informed for that. We don’t know exactly the details that could help terrorists defend themselves against the surveillance or cyber operations the U.S. agencies are now able to conduct.

JW: From a 20,000-foot view, do you think anything could have been done differently or more effectively than was done from pre-9/11, the decade following, and even now?

ES: The 9/11 Commission is a great document to review as to what didn’t go right obviously and all the failures of the government. In many ways, the U.S. government didn’t understand what Al Qaeda was or how it operated. So when terrorism hit, many in the government were taken aback. There were many clues that Al Qaeda was planning to attack the U.S. forces. Just before the time of 9/11, there was the bombing of the USS Cole warship in Yemen by Al Qaeda. The 1996 attacks of Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia was carried out by the terrorist group Hezbollah Al-Hejaz. In the Clinton Administration, officials had identified Al Qaeda as a serious risk. President Clinton countered this to a degree but it wasn’t something the government felt warranted sending troops into Afghanistan for. Even when President Bush came into office, they were not focused on terrorism as a priority either. Terrorism was something that happened overseas. Domestic terrorism, like Oklahoma City, affected us, but the Bush Administration in early 2001 is much more involved with missile defense and rogue missiles coming from North Korea or the rising potential threat from China.

JW: So was a full blown-out war the best strategy?

ES: Certainly it was understandable and probably necessary to go into Afghanistan initially to kick out Al Qaeda and topple the Taliban government. What didn’t happen though was to finish the job, as these terrorist elements fled into Pakistan. The US took its eye off that ball before it was completely finished, and shifted over into Iraq, which was not a terrorist haven at that time. The government had its issues with Saddam Hussein, of course, but that’s a whole different story. Iraq did not become a terrorist threat or magnet until the U.S. invaded Iraq, and it then became a draw for jihadis and terrorists all over the world, particularly from the Middle East.

In the meantime, the job in Afghanistan/Pakistan was not finished so you allow that element of the Taliban to regenerate, rearm, restock, and basically come back again. We are fighting them again because we didn’t finish that fight early on, when we had them really down and out.

JW: What year was that exactly?

This is 2001 and early 2002, when Al Qaeda and Bin Laden flees from his Tora Bora hideout in northeastern Afghanistan in December 2001. The last vestiges of the Taliban government are also falling by that time. You have your last major battle with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan early 2002, March or so. But by then the government is already starting to shift its attention, focus and resources to a war in Iraq, which starts a year later.

JW: So a decade is lost in a way… What methods, ideas, and/or practices did you find most effective in addressing, combating and deterring the long war on terror?

ES: We call it a holistic approach in the book. This is a combination of the traditional approaches of using the military—bombs and bullets, and what spies do very well, but also it incorporates more efforts of different federal agencies engaged in the campaign against terrorists. It’s actually the agencies you normally wouldn’t think of. In the State Department, for instance, diplomats are much more involved in embassies, trying to help those countries identify the root causes of terrorism. They are developing fine-grained strategies tailored right down to the neighborhood level and how to address the problems.

The FBI is now sending agents overseas to track down terrorists. Interestingly, Treasury is very important in stamping down the financing element for terrorists. You want to be able to use different tools at different times, like choke off their funds, if that is the optimal tool. You don’t have to always send in a SEAL team.

Germany understands the tradeoffs of abandoning nuclear power completely after 2022, in just ten years. And Leibrecht acknowledged it is harder to actually decommission a plant versus building one anew. Part of the German rationale for embracing more renewable energy is to promote energy independence and hedge against their position as an importer of energy resources, save the brown coal supplied by the eastern part of the country. Another motivation for their pro-renewable stance is to reduce carbon emissions’ burdens for future generations as part of their climate strategy. This complements their pact with greater Europe on cleaning up and as a major global economic powerhouse with responsibilities beyond their borders. Germany also plans to raise its profile as a global green-energy tech leader, with expectations to be one of the most energy efficient countries. It’s a green-growth, low-carbon energy strategy.

This German energy experiment is “unchartered territory” as Leibrecht mentioned but they have managed to keep the lights on thusfar. If anyone can do this, it’s the Germans.

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A few of his cautionary words were striking. First, he projects a long good-bye between the U.S. and Egypt, as the U.S. is not particularly popular in Egypt after supporting Mubarak for many decades. A new relationship will have to be forged with a delicate hand by the U.S. Second, the Egyptians are about to write a new constitution — just one year after 60 years of authoritarian rule. This is 4G fast by any standards, considering the country and its leadership very recently collapsed. And finally, with Egypt’s economy collapsing, current power brokers will need to find a vision for the development path of Egypt that makes sense. They do not currently have a Deng Xiaoping pro-development champion, as one DCFR member noted.

Dr. Cook also writes the blog, “From the Potomac to the Euphrates” at CFR.